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REMARKS ON JOVE AND THOR
Jeremy Gwiazda
In “How an Unsurpassable Being can Create a Surpassable World,” Daniel 
and Frances Howard-Snyder employ a fascinating thought experiment in an 
att empt to show that a morally unsurpassable being can create a surpassable 
world. Imagine that for each positive integer there is a world that a good, 
omnipotent, omniscient being can create. Jove randomly selects a number and 
creates the corresponding world; Thor simply creates world 888. The Howard-
Snyders argue that it is logically possible that Jove is morally unsurpassable. 
William Rowe counters that Thor morally surpasses Jove, thus contradicting 
the claim that Jove is morally unsurpassable. Does either Jove or Thor morally 
surpass the other? How do their strategies compare? Could a morally unsur-
passable being employ Jove’s strategy? The purpose of this paper is to answer 
these questions.
Can an unsurpassable being create a surpassable world? The question is 
important as many theists believe that an unsurpassable being, God, cre-
ated this surpassable world. Furthermore, if an unsurpassable being can-
not create a surpassable world and there exists an unending sequence of 
increasingly good creatable worlds, then an unsurpassable being cannot 
create any world.1 The Howard-Snyders present a fascinating thought ex-
periment in an att empt to show that an unsurpassable being can create a 
surpassable world. Imagine that for each positive integer (1, 2, 3 . . . ) there 
is a world that a good, omnipotent, omniscient being can create. Higher 
numbered worlds are morally bett er than lower numbered worlds. Two 
beings employ diﬀ erent strategies2 to create a world: Jove activates a 
randomizing device, which returns the number 777, and thereupon Jove 
creates the corresponding world; Thor simply creates world 888. The 
Howard-Snyders argue that it is logically possible that Jove is morally un-
surpassable.3 William Rowe counters that Thor morally surpasses Jove, 
thus contradicting the claim that Jove is morally unsurpassable.4
Does either Jove or Thor morally surpass the other? How do their 
strategies compare? Could a morally unsurpassable being employ Jove’s 
strategy? The purpose of this paper is to answer these questions. I begin 
by demonstrating the remarkable power of Jove’s strategy.
I. The Power of Jove’s Strategy
Instead of positing that Jove randomly selects 777,5 let us compare the 
strategies of Jove and Thor. Thor’s strategy is constant; he creates world 
888. Now let us ask: What is the probability that Jove, employing his strat-
egy of randomly selecting a positive integer, will select a number less than 
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or equal to 888? There is merely a positive infi nitesimal probability that 
Jove will select a number less than or equal to 888. A positive infi nitesimal 
is a number greater than 0, but less than any real number. The probability 
is greater than 0 because Jove could select 3, which is less than or equal 
to 888. But the probability is less than any real number because there are 
fi nitely many numbers less than or equal to 888, out of infi nitely many 
numbers total. The probability of choosing one of a fi nite number of out-
comes (888) out of an infi nite number of outcomes (all positive integers) 
both cannot be a real number and must be less than every positive real 
number. Thus the probability that Jove selects a number less than or equal 
to 888 is a positive infi nitesimal.
Let me recast the argument in a form that will appeal to those who 
enjoy placing a bet. Consider the bet of over/under 888.5. That is, you are 
deciding whether Jove will select a number under 888.5, or over 888.5. 
There are fi nitely many positive integers under 888.5. There are infi nitely 
many over. Conclusion: the over is a very solid bet.
In this paragraph, I outline how hyperreal numbers can be used to give 
the exact infi nitesimal probability that Jove selects a world from a given set 
of worlds, which I call the “success set.” These hyperreal numbers are in-
troduced as they allow us to discuss infi nitesimal (and later, infi nite) num-
bers; however, whenever I argue to a conclusion based on a consideration 
of hyperreal numbers, I will also include informal arguments to that same 
conclusion, as in the two paragraphs above. At present we are concerned 
with the following problem. Jove is selecting one number from among all 
positive integers. Given a success set (e.g., {1, 2, 3, . . . , 887, 888}), what is 
the probability that Jove selects a number in the success set? To begin with 
a small, concrete example, let us ask: What is the probability that Jove 
selects 1, 2, or 3; that is, the success set is {1, 2, 3}?6 The answer is given by 
building a hyperreal number, which is a sequence of real numbers.7 Each 
term of the sequence is a fraction. Denominators are 1, 2, 3, 4 . . . . Each 
numerator is the number of numbers less than or equal to the denomina-
tor that are in the success set. Thus the hyperreal number representing the 
probability that Jove selects 1, 2, or 3 is (1/1, 2/2, 3/3, 3/4, 3/5, 3/6, 3/7, . . . ).8 
This hyperreal number, call it ε, is an infi nitesimal. It is the probability that 
Jove selects worlds 1, 2, or 3.9 A further example may prove helpful. What 
is the probability that Jove selects a number greater than 3, i.e., the success 
set is {4, 5, 6, 7 . . . }? The answer is (0/1, 0/2, 0/3, 1/4, 2/5, 3/6, 4/7, . . . ). This 
number is infi nitesimally close to, but less than, 1. In fact, it is 1 – ε.
The key fact, argued in the previous three paragraphs, is that the 
probability that Jove randomly selects a number less than or equal to 888 
is infi nitesimal. The probability that Jove selects a number greater than 
888 is certainty (100% or 1) minus this infi nitesimal, henceforth “almost 
certain.” In fact, Jove is infi nitesimally likely to select a number less than 
any given positive integer. To see this, note that in the reasoning above, 
888 (also 3) played no crucial role; 888 can be replaced by any positive 
integer. The probability that Jove selects a number less than or equal to 
100100 is infi nitesimal. Assuming that past some number, C, we would 
not be able to comprehend the representation of any larger number, then 
Jove is infi nitesimally likely to select a number whose representation we 
will be able to comprehend. Put another way, it is almost certain that we 
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will not be able to comprehend Jove’s selected number, as it is almost cer-
tain that Jove will select a number greater than C. (The Howard-Snyders 
have Jove select 777 and Juno select 999. Each being is said to select at 
random.10 We can comprehend both of these numbers. Recall that it was 
almost certain that we would not be able to comprehend these numbers. 
My suspicion is that Jove and Juno are not actually randomly selecting 
positive integers.)
As Jove is almost certain to select a larger number than Thor, I believe 
that Jove morally surpasses Thor.11 Too much concern has been placed 
on the possibility of Jove’s selecting a low number, such as 777. Too litt le 
concern has been given to Thor’s opting out of creating a number larger 
than 888. Rowe writes:
Thor’s degree of moral goodness presumably is such that he is pre-
pared to sett le for world no. 888, but not prepared to sett le for the 
world (no. 777) that Jove’s degree of moral goodness allows him to 
sett le for. We thus have reason to believe that Thor’s degree of moral 
goodness exceeds Jove’s, that Thor is morally bett er than Jove.12
It is true that Thor will not sett le for a world less than 888; however, Thor 
will not strive for a world greater than 888. There are many more worlds 
greater than 888 than there are worlds less than 888. If either of Jove or 
Thor is sett ling, it is Thor. But what if Jove does select 777 (note that 777 is 
as likely to be selected as is any other number)? The Howard-Snyders are 
correct when they write, “Factors outside of one’s control can make a dif-
ference to how much good one brings about without making a diﬀ erence 
to how good one is. Jove has no control over what number his randomizer 
will deliver.”13
Jove surpasses Thor. Jove also surpasses any being who employs the strat-
egy of selecting a constant number. That is, it is not the case that if only Thor 
had selected a higher number then Thor would surpass Jove. To see this, 
let us introduce an entire sequence of omnipotent beings, called the “Thor-
sequence.” Thor simply created world 888. Rename this being “Thor888.” In 
general, let ThorN create world N. Now consider the following omnipotent 
beings: Jove, Thor1, Thor2, Thor3, . . . . Which one of these beings is morally 
best? I take this question to mean: Which one of these beings would a ra-
tional person choose to create his world? The answer is Jove, as for any N, 
Jove is infi nitesimally likely to select a smaller number than ThorN (i.e., N), 
and almost certain to select a larger number than ThorN. Thus Jove is the 
omnipotent being a rational person must choose from among Jove, Thor1, 
Thor2, Thor3, . . . . Compared to Jove, any ThorN sett les for a preposterously 
low world, one that Jove is almost certain to surpass.
Though in the original story Thor is omnipotent, we can think of each 
ThorN as being fi nitely powerful, where N is the maximum world that 
ThorN is able to create. We then see that Jove surpasses any one of these 
fi nitely powerful beings. Stephen Grover noted that if Jove is surpassed 
by Thor, then an odd result follows, “it is most unfortunate that God is 
omnipotent; if She had only been less-than-omnipotent, the world might 
have been a good deal bett er.”14 However, the infi nitely powerful Jove sur-
passes any fi nite being.
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II. Why Has Jove’s Strategy Been Underestimated?
I have argued that Jove’s strategy is bett er than Thor’s, and that Jove 
thereby morally surpasses Thor; however, a common view is that Jove’s 
strategy is poor, and that Thor surpasses Jove. How has it been possible 
for anyone to hold this position (that Thor surpasses Jove)? I believe that 
there are two main answers. First, intuitions formed in fi nite cases have 
been illicitly transferred to the infi nite case. Second, time plays a strange 
role in these deliberations which has not been properly appreciated. I dis-
cuss these answers in order.
Finite Intuitions
Rowe writes, “It is, I think, repugnant to suppose that an infi nitely wise 
being would be reduced to having to use a randomizer to select, among 
worlds diﬀ ering in value, the one He is to create.”15 Rowe’s view is widely 
shared.16 Why is Jove’s strategy considered repugnant? I believe that a 
large part of the answer is that intuitions formed in fi nite cases are being 
illicitly transferred to the infi nite case. Most, if not all, human dealings are 
with the fi nite. Thus our thoughts and intuitions are shaped by fi nite cases; 
however, intuitions gleaned from the fi nite realm do not necessarily carry 
over to the infi nite.17 In the fi nite case, randomly selecting a number is a 
terrible strategy. That is, imagine a fi nite case where Jove is to select a num-
ber from 1 to 100, and imagine that Jove selects randomly. This is a terrible 
strategy; Jove should simply have selected 100. Though randomly selecting 
a number is a terrible strategy in fi nite cases, I hope to have demonstrated 
its remarkable power in the infi nite case (that is, when selecting from all 
positive integers). I thus believe that Jove’s strategy is mistakenly thought 
repugnant largely because Jove’s strategy is repugnant in fi nite cases.
Jove’s strategy of randomly selecting a number is so powerful that it 
is diﬃ  cult to see how a good, omnipotent being, faced with an infi nite 
sequence of increasingly bett er worlds, could select a world nonrandomly. 
It may be impossible to justify the strategy of selecting a particular world, 
as Thor does. Given that Jove surpasses each ThorN, I do not see how one 
could argue that a good, omnipotent being could employ any of these 
Thor-strategies. Randomly selecting a number is a powerful tool in the 
infi nite, one not wisely cast aside. Recognizing the power of Jove’s strategy 
hopefully will dispel some of the sentiment aligned against Jove.
The Role of Time
Now let us turn to the second factor that has allowed Thor to be thought 
superior to Jove: time. Consider the objection that I have not done justice to 
the story of Jove and Thor. The objection runs as follows. Jove creates some 
world, J. Then let Thor be the being who creates world J + 111. Now we 
capture the spirit of having Jove create world 777 and Thor create world 
888. Certainly there is no harm in selecting a value for J, e.g., 777. And then 
it is clear that Thor surpasses Jove, so the objection goes.
But Thor does not surpass Jove. Instead careful att ention must be 
given to the strange role that time plays in these considerations. Notice 
in the paragraph above that Jove selects J (or 777) fi rst, and only then 
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does Thor select J + 111 (or 888). Selecting fi rst is a severe disadvantage 
for Jove. To see this, imagine two beings employing Jove’s strategy. JoveA 
randomly selects a positive integer before JoveB does. Let the number that 
JoveA selects be JA. JoveB then randomly selects a positive integer (i.e., 
JoveB employs the exact same strategy as JoveA). Following the reasoning 
above18 the probability that JoveB selects a number less than or equal to JA 
is infi nitesimal. The probability that JoveB selects a number greater than 
JA is almost certain. JoveB is almost certain to select a larger number than 
JoveA, simply by selecting aft er JoveA, even though both are employing 
the exact same strategy (at diﬀ erent times).19
Also note that if Jove selects a number aft er any other omnipotent be-
ing who employs any strategy at all, then Jove is almost certain to select 
a larger number. Let the world of the being who selects fi rst be F. Jove is 
then almost certain to select a number larger than F. Yet as I will argue 
below, there are strategies that surpass Jove’s. The lesson is that care 
must be taken when comparing omnipotent beings’ strategies. Jove is 
at a remarkable disadvantage creating fi rst, at a remarkable advantage 
creating second. Thus strategies must be compared by thinking of the 
strategies as being undertaken simultaneously, which I did above.20
III. Is Jove Morally Unsurpassable?
Of the three questions asked in the second paragraph, the third remains, 
“Could a morally unsurpassable being employ Jove’s strategy?” Klaas 
Kraay and Jesse Steinberg present similar arguments att empting to show 
that Jove’s strategy is surpassable. Essentially, Kraay and Steinberg have a 
being randomly select not from all positive integers, 1, 2, 3 . . . , but rather 
from a subset of the positive integers. Kraay limits the being to selecting 
from 2, 3, 4. . . . Steinberg suggests, e.g., 10001, 10002, 10003 . . . .21 Intui-
tively, whatever world Jove creates, Kraay’s being, Odin, does 1 bett er, and 
Steinberg’s being outperforms Jove by 10,000.
Hyperreal numbers can be used to match these intuitions. It is possible 
to defi ne the expected value of the number that a being is selecting from what 
I call the “creation set,” where this set is the worlds that a being is selecting 
from, e.g., Odin’s creation set is {2, 3, 4 . . . }. As above, we build a hyperreal 
number where each term is a fraction. The denominators are 1, 2, 3 . . . . The 
numerators are the sum of the fi rst n worlds in the being’s creation set,22 
where n corresponds to the denominator. Thus Odin’s expected value is 
(2/1, (2 + 3)/2, (2 + 3 + 4)/3, . . . ) = (2, 2.5, 3, . . . ). Jove’s expected value is (1/1, (1 
+ 2)/2, (1 + 2 + 3)/3, . . . ) = (1, 1.5, 2, . . . ).23 We can then subtract Jove’s expected 
value from Odin’s: (2, 2.5, 3, . . . ) – (1, 1.5, 2, . . . ) = (1, 1, 1, . . . ), which is 
the hyperreal number identifi ed with (equaling) 1. That is, Odin’s expected 
value is 1 greater than Jove’s. Similar considerations show that Steinberg’s 
being’s expected value is 10,000 greater than Jove’s expected value.
The Howard-Snyders may reject the moves of Kraay and Steinberg 
based on arguments related to the partition principle. Kraay considers and 
rejects such a move.24 I believe that the partition principle raises complex 
questions. I am thus uncertain whether or not Kraay and Steinberg have 
successfully shown that Jove is surpassable, though my belief is that they 
have. However, armed with the concept of expected value relating to these 
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beings, we can devise a strategy that far surpasses Jove’s strategy. Let Sam 
select from worlds 2, 4, 8, 16, . . . where the nth world is given by 2 raised 
to the nth power. Sam’s expected value is (2/1, (2 + 4)/2, (2 + 4 + 8)/3, (2 + 4 
+ 8 + 16)/4, . . . ), which is infi nitely larger than Jove’s expected value. That 
is, Sam’s expected value minus Jove’s expected value is an infi nite number, 
and is one whose terms grow exponentially (recall that both Odin and 
Steinberg’s being only bested Jove by a fi nite margin, e.g., 1 and 10,000, re-
spectively). Sam is thus clearly morally bett er than Jove.25 The intuition un-
derlying these expected values is that any being is likely to select a number 
“far along” his sequence, i.e., far into the creation set. Thus beings whose 
creation set grows quickly (or begins higher) are more likely to select a 
larger number.
Jove’s strategy is remarkably powerful. Jove surpasses the Thor-sequence 
of beings, each of whom creates a fi xed world, as Jove is almost certain to 
outperform any ThorN. The concern that Jove might create a “low” world, 
such as 777, has been overemphasized; I have indicated that the probability 
of this occurrence is infi nitesimal. Pick any N, no matt er how large, and 
the probability that Jove selects a number less than or equal to N is in-
fi nitesimal. Jove is almost certain to select a number greater than N. But 
Jove is surpassable. In particular, introducing the concept of expected value 
using the hyperreal numbers shows that Sam’s strategy is far superior to 
Jove’s. Sam, by turn, is surpassable, and this being is surpassable . . . . Can 
an unsurpassable being create a surpassable world? The Howard-Snyders 
have not demonstrated that an unsurpassable being can create a surpass-
able world.
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NOTES
1. The situation may be worse still. William Rowe holds that the existence 
of such an unsurpassable being is logically incompatible with an unending 
sequence of increasingly good worlds.
2. Where I write “strategy,” others have also writt en “procedure,” “selec-
tion procedure,” and “decision procedure.”
3. Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder, “How an Unsurpassable Being 
can Create a Surpassable World,” Faith and Philosophy 11 (1994): 260–68; re-
printed in Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions, ed. E. Stump and M. Mur-
ray (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 35–41.
4. William L. Rowe, “The Problem of No Best World,” Faith and Philosophy 
11 (1994): 269–71.
5. In order to simplify the exposition, I henceforth do away with the ran-
dom device, instead having Jove randomly select a number. I oft en assume 
that Jove and Thor are vying to select a larger number; the assumption is that 
they would then create the corresponding world. I fi nd that confl ating num-
bers and worlds in this way eases the exposition. Where necessary, I write 
“world.”
6. The case where the success set is {1, 2, 3, . . . , 887, 888} follows the same 
reasoning; however, the success set {1, 2, 3} is easier to work with.
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7. Roughly speaking—I am omitt ing a great deal of detail, including any 
discussion of a nonprincipal ultrafi lter and equivalence classes. For an excel-
lent introduction to the hyperreal numbers, see Robert Goldblatt , Lectures on 
the Hyperreals (New York: Springer, 1998). The hyperreal numbers extend the 
real numbers. Any real number, such as 2, is identifi ed with (equals) the con-
stant sequence where each term of the sequence is 2, or (2, 2, 2, . . . ). A hyper-
real number whose terms tend to 0 is an infi nitesimal, such as (1, 1/2, 1/3, 1/4, 
. . . ). A hyperreal number whose terms tend to infi nity is an infi nite number, 
such as (1, 2, 3, 4, . . . ). Infi nite hyperreal numbers appear in section III of this 
paper.
8. Consider the 3/5. The denominator is 5 because the denominators sim-
ply increase by 1, and the previous denominator was 4. The numerator is 3 
because 3 numbers less than or equal to 5 are in the success set, i.e., 1, 2, and 
3. In the case where the success set is {1, 2, 3, . . . , 887, 888}, the fi rst, e.g., 890 
terms of the hyperreal number are (1/1, 2/2, 3/3, . . . , 887/887, 888/888, 888/889, 
888/890 . . . ), i.e., the fi rst 888 terms are 1, then the numerator holds at 888 from 
then on. This again is an infi nitesimal (as the terms tend to 0), but is a larger 
infi nitesimal than when the success set is {1, 2, 3}.
9. Any sum of fi nitely many infi nitesimals is infi nitesimal, and thus is not 
close to 1, which is to say that these probabilities do not appear to be count-
ably additive. I believe that this demonstrates the poverty of limits in rela-
tion to an infi nite summation of infi nitesimals. Summation can be redefi ned 
in terms of multiplication by a hyperreal “counting number,” which restores 
countable additivity.
10. “How an Unsurpassable Being can Create a Surpassable World,” p. 
260 (Jove), p. 263 (Juno).
11. There are imaginable cases where Thor might be preferred. For instance, 
imagine that worlds 1 to 100 are similar, and horrible, whereas worlds greater 
than 100 are similar, and wonderful. An argument could be made that Thor 
is preferable to Jove. But this example seems contrived. Assuming a roughly 
equal diﬀ erence between worlds n and n+1, Jove morally surpasses Thor.
12. “The Problem of No Best World,” p. 270.
13. “How an Unsurpassable Being can Create a Surpassable World,” p. 263.
14. Stephen Grover, “This world, ‘Adams worlds’, and the best of all pos-
sible worlds,” Religious Studies 39 (2003): 152.
15. William L. Rowe, “Response to Hasker,” Religious Studies 41 (2005): 464.
16. I have encountered this view more oft en than not in several informal 
conversations on this topic.
17. Here is another example of intuitions in fi nite cases not transferring to 
the infi nite case. The Howard-Snyders consider strategies other than Jove’s, 
and imagine Jac, who fi rst “halves” the worlds, and then randomly selects 
from the worlds remaining (“How an Unsurpassable Being can Create a Sur-
passable World,” p. 265). But what does it mean to halve the worlds? The obvi-
ous answer, in the fi nite case, is to remove the lower half of the worlds. That 
is, if Jove were selecting from worlds 1 to 100, halving would mean removing 
worlds 1 to 50. But the positive integers have no lower half. Thus it is unclear 
exactly what to make of “halving” in the infi nite case.
18. To review the reasoning, JoveB is almost certain to select a larger num-
ber than JoveA because there are only fi nitely many positive integers less than 
or equal to JA, whereas there are infi nitely many greater than JA.
19. It also follows from these considerations that Jove, having selected a 
number at random, would immediately have reason to select a new number at 
random, reasoning that the second number would almost certainly be larger 
than the fi rst. And the same reason would argue for selecting a third number 
to supplant the second. And so on . . . .
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20. Neither Jove nor Thor created fi rst. Rather, I pointed out that Thor cre-
ates 888, and investigated the probability that Jove selects a number less than 
888. Thus the strategies can be thought of as being undertaken at the same 
time. Also, let me mention two assumptions which form the framework with-
in which the discussion of Jove and Thor occurs: 1) It makes sense to consider 
a being’s selecting one from all positive integers; 2) The fi nite, human intellect 
can successfully grapple with the intentions and strategies of an infi nite being. 
It is not clear that both of these assumptions are true. I consider the role that 
time plays so strange as to raise doubts regarding the truth of both 1 and 2. 
A further discussion of these points is beyond the scope of this paper, but see 
Jeremy Gwiazda, “The Train Paradox” Philosophia 34 (2006): 437–39 to see the 
author’s att empt to create a paradox starting from the observation that a being 
who selects a number fi rst from among all positive integers is almost certain 
to select a lower number than a being who selects second.
21. Klaas Kraay, “William L. Rowe’s A Priori Argument For Atheism,” Faith 
and Philosophy 22 (2005): 225–26; Jesse R. Steinberg, “Why an unsurpassable 
being cannot create a surpassable world,” Religious Studies 41 (2005): 326.
22. Strictly speaking, a set is unordered, and so the creation set might be 
bett er named the “creation sequence.” The creation set is to be thought of as 
being in increasing order.
23. Both of these expected values (hyperreal numbers) are infi nite, which 
makes sense in that the expected values must exceed any fi nite number.
24. “William L. Rowe’s A Priori Argument For Atheism,” pp. 225–26.
25. Sam comes with an added benefi t relative to Steinberg’s being, namely, 
it can be shown via a probabilistic argument that Steinberg’s being is merely 
infi nitesimally likely to select a higher number than Jove. That is, Steinberg’s 
being has a 50% + epsilon probability of outperforming Jove, and a 50% – ep-
silon probability of underperforming Jove. (Kraay likely would argue that the 
same does not hold for Odin. Odin’s strategy, as defi ned by Kraay, is parasitic 
on Jove’s selection of a number, namely, Odin takes Jove’s number and adds 
1. Thus Odin would always outperform Jove. But it is not clear that such a 
strategy is allowable. That is, Odin is allowed to randomly select a number 
and add 1, but Odin should not be allowed to, nor be assumed able to, interact 
with Jove.) Sam, by contrast, is almost certain to outperform Jove. There have 
been enough calculations in this paper, and so I spare the reader these further 
(straightforward, but relatively lengthy) details.
